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Abstract
Credit institutions often refuse to lend money to small firms. Usually, this happens 
because small firms are not able to provide collateral to lenders. Moreover, given the 
small amount of required loans, the relative cost of full monitoring is too high for 
lenders. Group lending contracts have been viewed as an effective solution to credit 
rationing of small firms in both developing and industrialized countries. The aim of 
this paper is to highlight the potential of group lending contracts in terms of credit 
risk management. In particular, this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the 
potential of group lending programs in screening good borrowers from bad ones to 
reduce the incidence of non-performing-loans (NPL). This paper shows that the suc-
cess of firms involved in selected group lending programs is due to the fact that co-
signature is an effective screening device: more precisely, if lenders make a proper use 
of co-signature to screen good firms from bad ones, then only firms that are good 
ex-ante enter group lending contracts. So, the main argument of this paper is that 
well designed group lending programs induce good firms to become jointly liable, 
at least partially, with other good firms and discourage other – bad-firms to do the 
same. Specifically, co-signature is proven to be a screening device only in the case of a 
perfectly competitive bank sector.
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INTRODUCTION 
1 In this paper we do not refer to any official definition of “small” firms. In fact, all results can 
be extended to micro and medium size firms. Generally speaking, they apply to all cases in 
which either collateral or credit history are lacking.
2 An early example is the Italian institution called Confidi.
Credit institutions often refuse to lend money to small firms1. Usually, 
this happens because small firms are not able to provide collateral to 
lenders. Moreover, given the small amount of required loans, the rela-
tive cost of full monitoring is too high for lenders. 
”Group lending” contracts have been viewed as an effective solution to 
credit rationing of small firms in both developing and industrialized 
countries. While these contracts have been known in industrialized 
countries for many years2, it was the initial success of group lending 
programs in countries like Bangladesh, Bolivia, Malawi, Thailand and 
Zimbabwe that caught the attention of many economists.
The common feature of group lending contracts is joint liability in 
case of default: in fact, the expected returns of each member of a group 
of borrowers work as collateral in case of default of other members. 
Small firms choose to enter a group and assume the joint liability in 
order to obtain better deals from lenders, that is more capital at lower 
interest rates. 
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However, while in developing countries group lending contracts have often been implemented by spe-
cialized banks or NGOs in order to rescue people from poverty, in industrialized countries they could 
play a different role: in particular, if such contracts are designed in order to allow a partial joint liability, 
that we name “co-signature”, they could work as an effective tool to manage credit risk. 
The aim of this paper is to highlight the potential of group lending contracts in terms of credit risk man-
agement. In particular, this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the potential of group lending 
programs in screening good borrowers from bad ones to reduce the incidence of non-performing-loans 
(NPL).
Scholars followed two alternatives routes to analyze group lending contracts: the first relies on the idea 
that such contracts provide incentives for similar types to group together (peer selection); the second 
relies on the idea that such contracts provide incentives for involved agents to choose safe activities (peer 
monitoring). 
In peer selection models group lending contracts are proven to be effectively different for risky types 
and safe types. In other words, given that risky types will voluntarily team with risky types (which are 
successful less often and, when they are successful, they are more likely to pay the joint liability pay-
ment) and safe types will voluntarily team with safe types, group lending contracts provide a way to 
price discriminate that is impossible under individual lending contracts. 
In peer monitoring models, instead, group lending contracts are proven to be a mechanism that gives 
borrowers an incentive to choose safe projects: since peer monitoring works as a commitment device, 
firms involved in group lending contracts usually obtain more capital at lower interest rates. 
Many recent papers studied new aspects of group lending contracts. In particular, some of them stud-
ied group formation games and some others showed that group lending programs improve the pool of 
borrowers. However, most of them focused their attention on data retrieved from rural credit markets 
in developing countries, underestimating the potential of group lending in competitive environments. 
This paper shows that the success of firms involved in selected group lending programs is due to the fact 
that partial joint liability is an effective screening device: more precisely, if lenders make a proper use 
of joint liability to screen good firms (i.e., firms with less risky investment projects3) from bad ones by 
allowing a partial joint liability (i.e., co-signature), then only firms that are good ex-ante enter group 
lending contracts. So, the main argument of this paper is that well designed group lending programs 
induce good firms to become jointly liable (at least partially) with other good firms and discourage other 
– bad – firms to do the same. 
Specifically, co-signature is proven to be a screening device only in the case of a perfectly competitive 
bank sector; it is not a screening device in the case of a credit market run by a benevolent lender (an 
NGO, for instance). In other words, while a separating equilibrium with co-signature may arise if the 
bank sector is competitive, it does not arise if the credit market is run by a planner willing to maximize 
aggregate surplus. This result also explains why some programs (that is, those run under competitive 
conditions) were successful in the past while others were not.
A monopolistic bank sector is also considered. If the bank sector is a monopoly, again there is no room 
for co-signature as a screening device. Such a result confirms the fact that co-signature is effective only 
in a competitive environment. Moreover, it suggests that the success of group lending programs should 
increase together with competition among lenders. 
3 More precisely, good firms are those willing to undertake investment projects that exhibit a first order stochastic dominance with respect 
to those undertaken by bad (that is, risky) firms.
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The paper is structurized as follows. 
The first section describes the role of co-signature in a monopolistic environment: the optimal contract 
for the monopolistic lender is without co-signature (i.e., there is no optimal contract that screens good 
firms from bad firms through partial joint liability). The second section takes into account the role of a 
benevolent lender that resembles a typical NGO: again, there is no room for co-signature. The third sec-
tion considers a competitive bank sector: if a market equilibrium exists it is a separating equilibrium in 
which good firms assume partial joint liability and bad firms do not. The last section concludes.
An Appendix contains the derivation of all first order and slackness conditions of the maximization 
problems. 
4 The assumption of risk aversion is consistent with our focus on small firms.
5 This is the typical assumption of all models that deal with asymmetric information on credit markets. Actually, if banks could distinguish 
good firms from bad ones, they would not need any screening device (not only co-signature, but collaterals as well). In reality, the 
screening process is costly when credit history is lacking. So, all screening devices are useful as long as they allow lenders to save on all (or 
some) costs related to credit evaluation. 
6 This assumption is consistent with the recent literature, both theoretical and experimental, on peer selection in financial markets. For a 
detailed explanation of this assumption see Di Cagno et al. (2012). Moreover, it is consistent with all peer monitoring arguments that 
were made to explain the success of the most popular group lending programs, as for example those implemented by Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, and the long tradition of Italian Confidi, that is associations of homogeneous (same area or same industry) SME, that provide 
guarantees to lenders by means of partial joint liability of all its members.
1. GROUP LENDING 
CONTRACTS IN A 
MONOPOLISTIC BANK 
SECTOR 
Consider a market for loans to finance investment 
projects:
• There is only one risk neutral bank that can 
supply loans. For simplicity, assume that the 
cost of one unit of capital for the bank is con-
stant and equal to r . 
• There are many risk averse firms that ask for 
loans to undertake investment projects4. They 
cannot provide any collateral. For simplic-
ity, we assume that all investment projects 
require one unit of capital. The unique argu-
ment of the strictly concave utility function 
of firms is profit; moreover, we assume that 
( )0 0U = .
• There are two types of projects (that is, two 
types of firms), one good and one bad. An 
investment project is good if it yields a profit 
0Π >  with probability and a profit 0Π =  
with probability 1 gp− . An investment proj-
ect is bad if it yields a profit 0Π >  with prob-
ability bp  and a profit 0Π =  with probabil-
ity 1 bp− , where 0 1.b gp p< < <  We as-
sume that the gp  fraction of bad projects is ( )0,1λ∈ .
• Firms know both their type and other firms’ 
type, while banks cannot distinguish a good 
firm from a bad one5. Firms can choose to co-
sign a fraction q  of each others’ loans. For 
simplicity, we assume that a good firm will co-
sign only another good firm’s loan and that a 
bad firm will co-sign only another bad firm’s 
loan6. 
The monopolistic bank offers a set of contracts in 
order to maximize its expected profit; moreover, 
by Revelation Principle, all contracts need to be 
truth telling mechanisms. This implies that the 
bank has to choose { }, , ,b g b gR R q q  to maximize 
the following objective function: 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2
2
2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1 2 ,
b b b b b b
g g g g g g
p R p p R q r
p R p p R q r
λ
λ
ª º+ − + − +¬ ¼
ª º+ − + − + −¬ ¼
such that:
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 ,b b b b b bp U R p p U R q uΠ − + − Π − − ≥  (1)
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 ,g g g g g gp U R p p U R q uΠ − + − Π − − ≥  (2)
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( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 
(3)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 (4)
and:
0, 0, 0, 0b g b gR R q q≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ,
Where bR   and gR  are the gross interest rates for 
bad and good firms. Constraints (1) and (2) are the 
participation constraints for bad firms and good 
firms respectively. Constraints (3) and (4) are the 
incentive compatibility constraints. 
Lemma 1. Constraint (2) can be ignored. 
Proof: From constraint (4): 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 
Moreover, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
g b g g b b
b b b b b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q u
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − − ≥
So, 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
g g g g g g
b b b b b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q u
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − − ≥
Hence, constraint (2) can be ignored. 
Lemma 1 says that the participation of bad firms 
implies the participation of good firms. So, by 
Lemma 1, the problem of the bank is to choose { }, , ,b g b gR R q q  to maximize expected profits 
subject to constraints (1), (3), and (4). 
Given the Lagrangian multiplier 
0, 0, 0γ ϕ θ≥ ≥ ≥ , it is possible to derive the first 
order conditions and the complementary slack-
ness conditions7. By making use of all conditions 
it is possible to characterize the optimal contracts 
through a set of lemmas.
7 All conditions cited in the proofs of the following Lemmas are reported in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. 0.θ >
Proof: Consider (A2).
Since by assumption:
( )1 2 0gpλ− > ,
( ) ( )
( )
2 1
0.
b g b b
g g
p U R p p
U R q
ϕ
′
′
ª ºΠ − + − ×
« » ≥
« »× Π − −¬ ¼
It must be the case that:
( )
( ) ( )
2
0.
1
g g
g g g g
p U R
p p U R q
θ
ª ºΠ − +
«
′
′
» >
« »+ − Π − −¬ ¼
Given that by assumption:
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 0.g g g g g gp U R p p U R qΠ − + − Π − − >′ ′
It follows that 0.θ >
Lemma 2 implies that constraint (4) is always 
binding. So, in any contract the bank will set:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
. 
In other words, good firms must be indifferent be-
tween revealing their type truthfully (i.e., accept-
ing contract { },g gR q ) and cheating (i.e., accept-
ing contract { },b bR q ).
Lemma 3. 0.γ ϕ+ >
Proof: Consider (A1).
Since by assumption:
2 0bpλ > ,
( )
( ) ( )
2
0.
1
g b
g g b b
p U R
p p U R q
θ
ª ºΠ − +
«
′
′
» >
+ − Π − −« »¬ ¼
Lemma 2 implies that:
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( ) ( )( ) ( )
2
0
1
b b
b b b b
p U R
p p U R q
γ ϕ
ª ºΠ − +
+ >« »
+ − Π − −« »¬ ¼
′
′
Given that by assumption:
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 0.
b b
b b b b
p U R
p p U R q
Π − +
+ − Π − − >
′
′
It follows that 0.γ ϕ+ >
Lemma 3 implies that at least one constraint 
among constraints (1) and (3) is always binding. 
Lemma 4. In any contract 0.bq =
Proof: Consider (A3).
If 0bq > , then:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
2 1 1
.
1
b b g g b b
b b b b
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ θ
γ ϕ
− + − Π −′
′
−
+ = − Π − −
So, substituting into (A1):
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2 1
1
2 1 0.
b
b b b
b b
g
b g b
g
g g b b
U R
p p p
U R q
p
U R p U R
p
p p U R q
λ
θ
θ
ª º§ ·Π −− − +« »¨ ¸¨ ¸Π − −« »© ¹¬ ¼
ª º
« »+ Π − + Π − +
−« »¬ ¼
+ − Π − −
′ ′
′ >
′
′
This is a contradiction. 
Lemma 4 states that bad firms are never offered 
to co-sign each other’s loans. The intuition is 
the following: given both the participation con-
straints and risk aversion, offering contracts 
with co-signature is costly for the monopolist. 
Moreover, offering contracts with co-signature 
to bad firms is more costly than offering con-
tracts with co-signature to good firms. In other 
8 In particular, whenever lenders are willing to screen good firms from bad ones by means of a screening device, they have to solve a trade-
off: in order to make profits, they have to allow participation of all types of borrowers by complying with participation constraints, but in 
order to screen different types, they have to impose an extra cost to firms by complying with incentive compatibility constraints (that is, 
the risk of being liable for a fraction of the loan of another member of the group). As said, the two types of constraints induce a trade-off, 
that is not possible to solve for bad firms.
words, it is impossible for lenders to solve the 
trade-off between participation and incentive 
compatibility constraints for bad firms8.
Lemma 5. Hence, 0.γ =
Proof: Consider (S2) and suppose 0ϕ > .
Case 1: 0gq > .
If 0ϕ > , then it must be the case that:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − − − Π − −
.
Since 0θ >  (Lemma 2) and 0bq >  (Lemma 4), 
the following must be true:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
b g b g g
g g b g g g
p U R p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
.
This is a contradiction. 
Case 2: 0gq = .
If 0gq > , from (A4) it must be the case that: 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 1 1
.
1
b b
g g g
p p
U R p p
λθ ϕ −+
Π − −′
−≥
Moreover, from (A2), it must be the case that:
( )
( )
2 1 b
gg
p
pU R
λθ ϕ−= +
Π −′
.
Now, if 0ϕ > , then the following must be true:
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
2 1 1
1
2 1
.
b b
g g g
b
gg
p p
U R p p
p
pU R
λ ϕ
λ ϕ
− −+ ≤
Π − −
+
Π −′
−≤
′
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This is a contradiction.
Hence, by Lemma 3, 0.γ >
Lemma 5 states that bad firms get no more than 
their reservation utility. So, constraint (1) is al-
ways binding. 
Lemma 6. In any contract .b gR R≥
Proof: Consider (S3).
Suppose that .b gR R<  Since:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − − − Π − −
by Lemmas 2 and 3, it must be the case that 0.gq <
This is a contradiction. 
Lemma 6 proves that bad firms are never charged 
a lower interest rate. Given 0,bq =  if b gR R< , 
it is not possible to enforce truth telling because 
good firms always find convenient to lie. 
Lemma 7. In any contract 0.gq =  Hence, 
0b gq q= =  and .b gR R=
Proof: Suppose 0.gq >  From (A2):
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2 1
1g g g g gp U R p U R q
λθ −=
Π − + Π −′− −′
.
Substituting into (A4), then the following must be 
true:
( )
( ) ( ) ( )1 1
g g
g g g g g
U R q
p U R p U R q
Π − −
=
Π − ′+ − Π − −
′
′ .
This is a contradiction. Hence, 0.b gq q= =
Moreover, from Lemma 2 and (S3) it follows that 
.b gR R=
Lemma 7 fully characterizes the contract offered 
by the monopolist. No firm is offered to co-sign 
and both bad and good firms pay the same interest 
9 The interpretation of aggregate surplus as a social welfare function is in terms of an unborn firm’s ex-ante expected utility.
rate. Moreover, bad firms get an utility u , while 
good firms get an utility greater than u . 
There is no room for co-signature. 
2. GROUP LENDING 
PROGRAMS IN A CREDIT 
MARKET RUN BY  
A BENEVOLENT LENDER 
Now, suppose that the credit market described in 
the previous section is run by a benevolent lender 
willing to maximize aggregate surplus. This lender 
has to choose { }, , ,b g b gR R q q  to maximize the 
following objective function9:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2
2
1
1
1
b b b b b b
g g
g g g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R
p p U R q
λ
λ
Π − + − Π − − +
+ − Π − +
+ − Π − −
,
such that:
( )( )
( ) ( )
( )
2
2
2 2 1 2
1 2 2 1
2 0,
b b b b b b
g g g g
g g
p R p p R q r
p R p p
R q r
λ
λ
ª º+ − + − +¬ ¼
ª+ − + − ×¬
º× + − =¼
 (5)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 (6)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 (7)
and: 
0, 0, 0, 0b g b gR R q q≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ .
Constraint (5) is a zero profit condition. 
Constraints (6) and (7) are the incentive compat-
ibility constraints. 
To start, consider the simplified problem of choos-
ing { }, , ,  b g b gR R q q to maximize the planner’s ob-
jective function under the zero profit condition only. 
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Given the Lagrangian multiplier 0γ > , it is pos-
sible to derive the first order conditions and the 
complementary slackness conditions10. By making 
use of all conditions, it is possible to characterize 
the optimal contracts through a set of lemmas.
Lemma 8. The contract 
( )0, 0,b g b g g b g
rq q R R
p p pλ
­ ½° °= = = =® ¾+ −° °¯ ¿
 
is the unique solution to the simplified problem 
of the benevolent planner.
Proof: Consider (A7).
If 0bq > , then:
( ) .
2
b bU R qγ Π − −′=
So, substituting into (A5), it follows that:
( ) ( )2 2 0.b b b b bp U R p U R q′ ′− Π − + Π − − =
Since, by strict concavity of U this is a contradic-
tion, it must be the case that 0.bq =  The same 
proof applies to gq  considering (A6) and (A8).
Now, from (A5) and (A6) it follows that:
( ) ,
2
bU Rγ Π −′=
and
( )
.
2
gU Rγ
Π −′
=
This implies that .b gR R=  Moreover, ( )/b g g b gR R r p p pλª º= = + −¬ ¼  from the zero 
profit condition. 
The contract described in Lemma 8 also satisfies 
both participation constraints of the benevolent 
lender problem. So, Lemma 9 follows.
Lemma 9. In any optimal contract 
( )0, 0,b g b g g b g
rq q R R
p p pλ
­ ½° °= = = =® ¾+ −° °¯ ¿
.
10 All conditions are reported in the Appendix.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 8 and the fact that 
the contract 
( )0, 0,b g b g g b g
rq q R R
p p pλ
­ ½° °= = = =® ¾+ −° °¯ ¿
 
also satisfies participation constraints. 
Again, there is no room for co-signature. A be-
nevolent lender willing to maximize aggregate 
surplus offers a pooling contract with zero co-
signature. Mixed results of group lending pro-
grams in developing countries may be the con-
sequence of the fact that they are not based on 
the economics of co-signature, rather they are 
implemented by benevolent institutions (devel-
opment banks, donors,…) to rescue people from 
poverty.
3. GROUP LENDING 
CONTRACTS IN  
A COMPETITIVE BANK 
SECTOR
In this section, we characterize a separating equi-
librium that arises from the implementation of 
group lending programs by competitive banks 
(Section 3.1); then we state the conditions under 
which such an equilibrium exists (Section 3.2).
3.1. Separating contract 
Now, consider an economic environment identi-
cal to the one described in Section 2 except for the 
fact that the bank sector is perfectly competitive. 
In other words, assume that there is free entry in 
the bank sector. 
This implies that each competitive bank has to 
choose { }, , ,b g b gR R q q  to maximize the follow-
ing objective function: 
( )( )
( )
( )( )
2
2
2 2 1 2
1 2 2
1 2 ,
b b b b b b
g g g
g g g
p R p p R q r
p R p
p R q r
λ
λ
ª º+ − + − +¬ ¼
ª+ − + ×¬
º× − + − ¼
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such that:
( ) ( )
( )
2 1
,
b b b b
b b
p U R p p
U R q u
Π − + − ×
× Π − − ≥  (8)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 (9)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 ,
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − ≥
≥ Π − + − Π − −
 (10)
and: 
0, 0, 0, 0b g b gR R q q≥ ≥ ≥ ≥ ,
where bR  and gR  are the gross interest rates 
for bad and good firms. Constraints (8) is the 
participation constraint for bad firms11 and con-
straints (9) and (10) are the incentive compatibility 
constraints.
Given the Lagrangian multiplier 0, 0, 0γ ϕ θ≥ ≥ ≥  , 
it is possible to derive the first order conditions 
and the complementary slackness conditions12. By 
making use of all conditions, it is possible to char-
acterize the separating equilibrium through a set 
of lemmas.
The first order conditions and the complementary 
slackness conditions coincide with those derived 
in the case of a monopolistic lender. 
However, given free entry, two zero profit con-
ditions have to be added in order to properly de-
scribe the equilibrium on a competitive credit 
market13. So, the following equalities must hold: 
2
,b b b bb
b
p q p q rR
p
− + +=  (11)
and
2
.g g g gg
g
p q p q r
R
p
− + +=  (12)
11 The participation constraint for good firms can be ignored. The proof is the same as in Lemma 1.
12 All conditions are reported in the Appendix.
13 From a technical standpoint, the zero profit conditions imply no cross subsidization. Banks make zero profits on each type of a firm/
borrower.
Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 apply to this case, too. So, 
competitive banks will set:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
Moreover, either constraint (8) or (9) (or both) are 
binding and 0.bq =  In other words, good firms 
must be indifferent between revealing their type 
truthfully (i.e., accepting contract { },g gR q ) and 
cheating (i.e., accepting contract { },b bR q ); also, 
in any equilibrium, whether pooling or separating, 
firms with bad projects never cosign each other’s 
loans. 
Lemma 10. In any contract 0.gq >
Proof: Since
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
From zero profit conditions (11) and (12), it follows 
that:
( )
( )
2
2
r
r1
r
r1 .
g g g g
g
g g g g
g
g b b b
b
g g b b
b
p U p q q
p
p p U p q
p
p U p q q
p
p p U p q
p
§ ·
Π − − + +¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
§ ·
+ − Π − − =¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
§ ·= Π − − + +¨ ¸
© ¹
§ ·+ − Π − −¨ ¸
© ¹
Given that g bp p>  by assumption, it can never 
be the case that:
0.g bq q= =
So, since 0bq =  from Lemma 4, then 0.gq >
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Lemma 10 states that good firms co-sign a fraction 
0gq >  of their loans. This implies that in a per-
fectly competitive credit market the optimal con-
tract is a separating contract, where good firms 
co-sign and bad firms do not. This does not mean 
that this separating outcome is an equilibrium. As 
it was already said, the conditions under which a 
separating equilibrium exists will be stated in the 
next subsection (3.2).
Lemma 11. 0ϕ = . Hence, 0γ > .
Proof: Consider (S5) and suppose 0ϕ > .
Then, it must be the case that:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
1 .
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
Now, since 0θ >  by Lemma 2 and 0bq =  by 
Lemma 4, it follows that:
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1
1 .
b g b g g
g g g g g
p U R p U R q
p U R p U R q
Π − + − Π − − =
= Π − + − Π − −
This is a contradiction by Lemma 10. 
Hence, 0γ >  by Lemma 3.
Lemma 11 states that bad firms get no more than 
their reservation utility. Given the preceding 
Lemmas, it is possible to characterize the sepa-
rating contract. In particular, from the zero prof-
it conditions it is possible to derive the interest 
rates that banks are charging to good firms and 
bad firms. In particular, bad firms do not co-sign 
and pay a higher interest rate; good firms co-sign 
a fraction gq  of each other’s loans and pay a lower 
interest rate. 
The equilibrium level of co-signature, gq , makes 
good firms indifferent between their contract and 
the one offered to bad firms. Finally, competi-
tion among banks determines the cost of capital. 
Lemma 12 summarizes these results. 
Lemma 12. In any separating contract 
/ )( / gb b g g g gR r p r p p q q R= > + − = , where gq  
is such that:
 ( )
( )
2
2
r 1
r r
r1 .
g g g g g g
g
g g g
g b
g g
b
p U p q q p p
p
U p q p U
p p
p p U
p
§ ·
Π − − + + − ×¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
§ · § ·× Π − − = Π − +¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸ © ¹© ¹
§ ·+ − Π −¨ ¸
© ¹
Moreover, r  is such that b
b
rp U u
p
§ ·Π − =¨ ¸
© ¹
.
Proof: It follows from all previous Lemmas.
Hence, if there is free entry, the equilibrium, if it 
exists, is a separating equilibrium in which good 
firms co-sign and bad firms do not. It is worth no-
ticing that the great difference between the com-
petitive case and the benevolent lender case is in 
the lack of cross subsidization. 
So, the interpretation of this result is the follow-
ing: firms in group lending programs may exhib-
it higher repayment rates than other firms when 
they are better ex-ante, that is when group lending 
contracts are able to screen good firms from bad 
ones. We proved that this is the case when markets 
are competitive, that is when free entry prevents 
subsidization across types.
3.2. Existence  
of separating equilibrium
The separating contract described in Section 3.1 is 
not an equilibrium if a profitable deviation breaks it. 
Now, define gR  as the interest rate that satisfies 
the following equality:
( )
( )
2 r 1
r ,
g g g g g g
g
g g g g
g
p U p q q p p
p
U p q p U R
p
§ ·
Π − − + + − ×¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
§ ·
× Π − − = Π −¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
where gq  is the level of co-signature defined by 
Lemma 12. This equality implies that a contract { }, 0g gR q =  guarantees to good firms the same 
level of utility that they get in the separating con-
tract defined by Lemma 12. 
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Hence, for the separating equilibrium to exist, it 
must be the case that:
( ) .g g b g
rR
p p pλ
<
− +
In other words, gR  must be smaller than the 
zero profit pooling interest rate. If it is not the 
case, then there exists a profitable deviation. For 
example, an entrant bank could offer a pooling 
contract without co-signature and charge an in-
terest rate between gR  and ( ) )/ ( g b gr p p pλ − +
. So, the entrant bank could attract all firms14 
and earn a profit greater than zero15.
From the previous equality it is easy to see that: 
( ) .g g g gg g b g
r rp q q R
p p p pλ
+ − < <
− +
So, a necessary condition for a separating equilib-
rium to exist is that:
( ) .g g gg g b g
r rp q q
p p p pλ
+ − <
− +
This condition implies that:
14 It will obviously attract all bad firms. It will also attract good firms because the interest rate they are charged is lower than the interest rate 
that makes them indifferent between a contract with cosignature and one without.
15 Profit is greater than zero because the interest rate is greater than ( ) )/ ( g b gr p p pλ − + , that is the zero profit pooling interest rate.
( )
2
0,g g g g
b g g g g
g
p q p q
rp p p q q
p
λ −> <
§ ·
− + −¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
which is always true.
Obviously, a sufficient condition for a separating 
equilibrium to exist is:
( ) .g gg g b g
r rp q
p p p pλ
+ <
− +
This condition implies that:
( )
2
.g g g g
b g g g
g
p q p q
rp p p q
p
λ −>
§ ·
− +¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
If the fraction of bad firms is not large enough, 
there might be a profitable deviation that breaks 
the separating equilibrium. Co-signature is too 
expensive for good firms if bad firms are too few. 
However, if the separating equilibrium exists, then 
it is also a constrained Pareto optimal outcome. In 
this case, good firms are better off and bad firms 
are worse off with respect to the case in which co-
signature is not allowed.
CONCLUSION
The main result of this paper is that partial joint liability, co-signature, is a screening device only if the 
bank sector is perfectly competitive. In other words, if there is free entry in the credit market, equilib-
rium, if it exists, is a separating equilibrium in which good firms co-sign and bad firms do not. 
Three different economic environments were compared in the paper. 
The first comparison is between a competitive credit market and a monopolistic one. This comparison 
is to suggest that group lending contracts may become more effective if credit markets evolve toward 
liberalization and competition. 
The second, and most relevant, comparison is between a competitive credit market and a credit mar-
ket run by a benevolent lender. Co-signature helps lenders to screen firms only if the credit market is 
competitive. Hence, mixed results of group lending programs in developing countries may be seen as a 
consequence of this result. 
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In other words, if the market is run by a benevolent lender, co-signature is proven not to be able to 
screen good firms from bad ones. This implies that both types of firms may enter group lending pro-
grams, yielding mixed outcomes in terms of performance and repayment rates.
As a final remark, few words about enforcement of joint liability in case of default deserve to be said, in 
particular since our focus is on SME. The discussion about enforcement is beyond the scope of the paper. 
However, it is a relevant topic: examples of group lending programs dedicated to individuals confirm 
that together with co-signature other actions should be undertaken by lenders in order to make enforce-
ment easier: oblige borrowers to deposit on checking accounts managed by lenders, oblige weekly re-
ports of cash-flow dynamics, and so on. Probably, if co-signature has to be implemented as a screening 
device, similar actions should be designed for SME.
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APPENDIX
First order conditions for a monopolistic bank:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 1
1 0
b b b b b b b
g b g g b b
p p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º′ ′
′ ′
− + Π − + − Π − − +¬ ¼
ª º+ Π − + − Π − − =¬ ¼
 (A1)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1 2 1
1 0
g b g b b g g
g g g g g g
p p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º′ ′
′ ′
− + Π − + − Π − − −¬ ¼
ª º− Π − + − Π − − =¬ ¼
 (A2)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1
1 0
b b b b b b
g g b b
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − +¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º+ − Π −′ − ≤¬ ¼
′  (A3a)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1
1 0
b b b b b b
g g b b
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − +¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º+ − Π −′ − =¬ ¼
′                 if 0bq >
 
(A3b)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1
1 0
g g b b g g
g g g g
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − −¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º− − Π − −¬ ′ ≤¼
′  (A4a)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1
1 0
g g b b g g
g g g g
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − −¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º− − Π − −¬ ′ =¼
′                 if 0gq >  (A4b)
Complementary slackness conditions for a monopolistic bank:
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 0b b b b b bp U R p p U R q uγ ª ºΠ − + − Π − − − =¬ ¼  (S1)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
0
1
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
ϕ
ª ºΠ − + − Π − − −
« » =
− Π − − − Π − −« »¬ ¼
 (S2)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
0
1
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
θ
ª ºΠ − + − Π − − −
« » =
« »− Π − − − Π − −¬ ¼
 (S3)
First order conditions for a benevolent lender:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 2 2 1 0b b b b b b b b bp U R p p U R q p p pγª º ª º− Π − + − Π − − + + − =¬ ¬′ ¼′ ¼  (A5)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )2 21 2 2 1 0g g g g g g g g gp U R p p U R q p p pγª º ª º− Π − + − Π − − + + − =¬ ¬′ ¼′ ¼  (A6)
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 0b b b b b bp p U R q p pγ− − Π − − + − ≤′   (A7a)
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( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 0b b b b b bp p U R q p pγ− − Π − − + − =′                             if 0bq >  (A7b)
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 0g g g g g gp p U R q p pγ− − Π − − + − ≤′  (A8a)
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 0g g g g g gp p U R q p pγ− − Π − − + − =′                           if 0gq >  (A8b)
First order conditions for a competitive bank:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 1
1 0
b b b b b b b
g b g g b b
p p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º′ ′
′ ′
− + Π − + − Π − − +¬ ¼
ª º+ Π − + − Π − − =¬ ¼
 (A9)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1 2 1
1 0
g b g b b g g
g g g g g g
p p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º′ ′
′ ′
− + Π − + − Π − − −¬ ¼
ª º− Π − + − Π − − =¬ ¼
 (A10)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1
1 0
b b b b b b
g g b b
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − +¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º+ − Π −′ − ≤¬ ¼
′  (A11)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 1 1
1 0
b b b b b b
g g b b
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ γ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − +¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º+ − Π −′ − =¬ ¼
′
                      
if 0bq >  (A11b)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1
1 0
g g b b g g
g g g g
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − −¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º− − Π − −¬ ′ ≤¼
′
 (A12a)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 2 1 1
1 0
g g b b g g
g g g g
p p p p U R q
p p U R q
λ ϕ
θ
ª º ª º− − + − Π − − −¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
ª º− − Π − −¬ ′ =¼
′
                    
if 0gq >  (A12b)
Complementary slackness conditions for a competitive bank:
( ) ( ) ( )2 1 0b b b b b bp U R p p U R q uγ ª ºΠ − + − Π − − − =¬ ¼  (S4)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
0
1
b b b b b b
b g b b g g
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
ϕ
ª ºΠ − + − Π − − −
« » =
− Π − − − Π − −« »¬ ¼
 (S5)
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1
0
1
g g g g g g
g b g g b b
p U R p p U R q
p U R p p U R q
θ
ª ºΠ − + − Π − − −
« » =
« »− Π − − − Π − −¬ ¼
 (S6)
